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Defendants/Third-party 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
WILLIAM C. PETERSEN, 
Third-party Defendant. 
Case No. 89-0473-CA 
V\b 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS JOHN M. FRY AND JUDITH L. FRY 
AlBljEAL FROM A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OF 
•HE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE BOYD L. PARK 
SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, for! 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
FRED D. IK)WARD, for: 
HOWARD, llEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East .! 30 North 
Provo, UT 34601 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
RespondUkit 
JURISDICTION 
Under UCA 1953, 78-2A-3(2)(j), the Utah Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The defendant presented competent evidence during the 
trial. The evidence presented by the plaintiff created 
substantial factual disputes. The matter was submitted to the 
jury and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. 
The judge overturned the jury's verdict by granting a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
The trial court's refusal to give an "unavoidable 
accident" instruction was not grounds for overturning the jury's 
verdict. 
The trial court's finding that the jury was confused 
was not supported by the facts and would not be grounds for 
reversal of the jury's verdict. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JOHN M. FRY and JUDITH L. FRY, 
Defendants/Third-party 
Plaintiff/Appellants, 
v. 
WILLIAM C. PETERSEN, 
Third-party Defendant 
Case No. 89-0473-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Brief of Appellants, John M. Fry and Judith L. Fry, 
hereinafter called "Fry". 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the court err by entering it's order of judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict even though substantial evidence 
existed supporting the jury's determination? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury action based upon a two-
vehicle accident at an intersection in Orem, Utah. 
This matter was tried by jury in front of the Honorable 
Boyd L. Park. After a trial on disputed facts and disputed 
expert opinion, the jury found the defendants/appellants, Fry, 
not negligent. Thereafter the court entered a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Fry seeks a reversal of the judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict entered by the lower court in the face of disputed 
evidence, and reinstatement of the jury verdict in his favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
* Subsequent to receiving the briefing schedule by the 
Court of Appeals, it was determined that the trial transcript for 
the second day of trial , November 29, 1988, had not been 
submitted by the reporter. The transcript was received but the 
original was not numbered in accordance with Rule 11(b) of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. As a result, references to 
that transcript are hereinafter ("TR, pg. " ) . 
le This accident occurred at the intersection of 1300 
South and Main Streets in Orem, Utah County, State of Utah. 
(R-559, pg. 47). 
2. Petersen was the driver of the Volkswagen. (TR, pg. 
6). 
3. Fry, the driver of the other vehicle involved in 
the accident, was westbound on 1300 South and intended to turn 
left or south. (TR, pg. 36). 
2 
4. Rhodes was a passenger in the Volkswagen driven by 
Peterson. (TR, pg. 55). 
5. Substantial evidence existed that Fry was not 
negligent: 
a) Fry testified that as he approached the 
intersection, the light turned red. He stopped and waited 
through the cycle of the light. (TR, pg. 36). 
b) During the time he was stopped at the red 
light, he was looking for on-coming traffic. He saw none with 
the exception of a brown station wagon. (TR, pg. 37). 
c) The brown station wagon was approaching from 
the west and was turning left or northbound. Fry saw no other 
headlights or vehicles coming, so he started to make his turn. 
(TR, pg. 41, 44). 
d) Petersen normally travelled in the left hand 
lane of traffic. (TR, pg. 19). However, the collision occurred 
in the eastbound traffic's far right lane in the intersection. 
(R-559, pg. 58). 
e) Shelley Lambert, Fry's passenger, testified 
that she was looking for on-coming traffic and saw none. (TR, 
pg. 41; TR, pg. 109, 110). 
f) Fry's expert testified that the Volkswagen in 
question was obscured from Fry's sight by other traffic. (R-497). 
3 
6* Prior to the impact, the Petersen vehicle attempted 
to avoid the accident by braking. (R-559, pg. 51). 
7. The experts called by Rhodes disagreed with Fry's 
description of his actions (TR, pg. 36; TR, pg. 156), with the 
speed at which Fry proceeded into the intersection, (TR, pg. 39, 
TR, pg. 157), with the speed at which the Petersen vehicle was 
traveling prior to braking, (R-560, pg. 26; R-560, pg. 36; R-493; 
TR, pg. 167), and with the cause of the accident (R-559, pg. 57; 
TR, pg. 169; R-497). 
8. Rhodes' experts testified that, based upon their 
calculations, Fry was negligent. (R-559, pg. 57; TR, pg. 169). 
Fry's expert testified that, based on his calculations, Fry was 
not negligent. (R-467). 
9. The jury was instructed on the issues of 
negligence. (R-357, 358). The court further instructed the jury 
that the mere fact that an accident happened does not support an 
inference that the defendants, or any party, was negligent. 
(R-363). The court refused to instruct the jury on unavoidable 
accident. (R-304, 385). 
10. Petersen made a motion for a directed verdict 
which was granted. (R-387). 
11. Rhodes made a motion for directed verdict based 
upon the stipulation that Rhodes, as a passenger in the Petersen 
4 
vehicle, was not negligent; upon the court's ruling as a matter 
of law that a case had not been proven against Petersen; and upon 
the court's refusal to instruct the jury on "unavoidable 
accident". (R-292). 
12. The court took Fry's motion for directed verdict 
under advisement and submitted the matter to the jury. The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Fry when it answered "No" to 
Special Verdict instruction #1 which stated: (R-385). 
1. At the time and place of the 
incident in question and under the 
circumstances as shown by the evidence, was 
defendant, John M. Fry, negligent? 
Yes No X 
13. The court subsequently entered a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the plaintiff (R-442), 
from which defendant Fry appealed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT MAY ONLY OVERTURN A JURY 
VERDICT IF, AFTER VIEWING ALL OF THE EVIDENCE 
IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE VERDICT, NO 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE VERDICT. 
At the close of defendant's case in chief, the 
plaintiff moved, pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
50, for a motion for directed verdict. Rule 50(b) states in 
part: 
5 
Whenever a motion for directed verdict made 
at the close of all the evidence is denied or 
for any reason is not granted, the court is 
deemed to have submitted the action to the 
jury subject to a later determination of the 
legal questions raised by the motion. 
• * * 
If a verdict was returned the court may 
allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the 
judgment and either order a new trial or 
direct the entry of judgment as if the 
requested verdict had been directed.... 
This court is asked to review and reverse the trial 
court's entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The 
standard that the trial court must apply when considering a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is set out in the 
case of Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). In that 
case the court stated: 
The standard to be applied by the trial 
court in determining whether to grant a 
motion for a j.n.o.v* is stricter than the 
standard for deciding to grant a new trial. 
A j.n.o.v. can be granted only when the 
losing party i« entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. 
The trial court should grant a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict only if, after viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the non-movant, it finds that no 
competent evidence supports the verdict. In reviewing the trial 
court's determination of such issues, the Court of Appeals must 
apply the same standard. King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 620 
(Utah 1987). In addition to viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the non-movant, the court must accord every 
reasonable inference fairly drawn from the evidence the same 
degree of deference. Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah 
1983)c 
Fry's theory of the case was that his view of the 
oncoming traffic was obstructed by another vehicle and that his 
turning left was reasonable under the existing circumstances. 
In support of this theory, competent evidence was presented by 
Fry, supported by the direct testimony of his passenger Shelley 
Lambert and by the expert testimony of Dr. Rudolf Limpert. 
In determining whether or not to grant such a motion, 
the court is not allowed to weigh the evidence or to determine 
which witnesses it feels are the most persuasive or truthful. 
The Court of Appeals of Ohio in Cox v. Oliver Machinery Co., 41 
Ohio App. 3d 28, 534 N.E. 2d 855, 857, 858 (1987) stated: 
In ruling on a directed verdict — or, in our 
case considering such a ruling on appeal — a 
court must construe the evidence most 
strongly in favor of the non-moving party and 
determine whether reasonable minds can come 
but to one conclusion on the evidence 
submitted, that conclusion being adverse to 
non-moving party. (Cite omitted.) If 
reasonable minds can reach different 
conclusions, the matter must be submitted to 
the jury. (Cite omitted.) The court 
considers the motion without weighing the 
evidence or determining the creditability of 
witnesses. (Cite omitted.) A motion for 
directed verdict raises a question of law 
because it examines the materiality of the 
evidence rather than the conclusions to be 
drawn from the evidence. Thus, the court 
does not determine whether one version of the 
facts presented is more persuasive than 
another; rather, it determines whether only 
one result can be reached under the theories 
of law presented in the complaint. 
(Parenthes is added.) 
The record before this court demonstrates that there 
was sufficient material evidence to support the jury's verdict. 
The jury found that the defendant's actions were reasonable and 
prudent under the conditions that they determined existed at the 
time of the accident. 
Fry and Rhodes both submitted expert testimony which 
created a factual dispute. As stated in Bennion v. LeGrand 
Johnson Const. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Utah 1985), "[w]here 
evidence is in conflict in a jury trial, we assume that the jury 
believed those facts that support its verdict (cite omitted), and 
we view the facts and the reasonable inferences that arise from 
those facts in a light most supportive of the jury's verdict." 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT RELIED UPON ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE AN 
"UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT" INSTRUCTION AS A BASIS 
FOR GRANTING A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT. 
In discussing the case law on "unavoidable accident," 
it is critical to avoid being distracted by that label. The 
8 
trial court became so involved with the term "unavoidable 
accident" that it failed to examine the role which such an 
instruction plays in a negligence claim. In Anderton v. 
Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 834 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court 
held: 
Unavoidable accident, rather than being a 
separate legal doctrine, is simply a 
recognition of the fact that an incident 
causing injury to the plaintiff does not 
necessarily give rise to liability in the 
defendant. Where the injury arises from a 
set of circumstances which do not reflect a 
lack of due care on anyone' part, no recovery 
may be had under a theory of negligence, the 
accident having been "unavoidable." 
* * * 
As explained above, a properly drafted 
unavoidable accident instruction punctuates 
the necessity of finding both negligence and 
causation prior to assigning liability. It 
is true that such an instruction amounts, in 
essence, to a reemphasis of principles 
already implicit in other instructions. 
The failure of the court to give such an instruction 
when requested did not amount to reversible error since the jury 
found in favor of the defendant on the instructions given. 
However, reversible error was committed by the court when it 
relied upon the failure to give an unavoidable accident 
instruction as the basis for its granting the judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 
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With the trial court's discretion in tailoring the jury 
instructions to the evidence presented, the court correctly held 
that the defendant's theory of the case could, in fact, be 
presented under the jury instructions which were given. (See 
Statement of Facts), "The trial court has a duty to 'cover the 
theories and points of law of both parties in its instructions, 
provided there is competent evidence to support them'". Hillier 
v. Lamborn. 740 P.2d 300, 302 (Utah App. 1987). "The general 
rule is that a party is entitled to have his theory of the case 
submitted to the jury." Id. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
GRANTING THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOT-
WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT BECAUSE SUBSTANTIAL 
FACTUAL DISPUTES EXISTED. 
In evaluating the reasoning behind the court's granting 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it is helpful to look at 
the motion submitted by plaintiff. Rhodes stated that since the 
court ruled as a matter of law that Petersen was not negligent 
and since the parties stipulated that Rhodes was not negligent, 
therefore, the court's refusal to instruct the jury on 
unavoidable accident resulted in the conclusion that Fry was 
negligent. (R-292). 
The court's ruling (R-442) in paragraphs 4 and 5 
illustrate the factual disputes that were presented during the 
10 
course of the trial. The defendant testified that while waiting 
for the light to turn green, he looked for oncoming traffic. 
After the light turned green, he proceeded into the 
intersection. He had observed an on-coming station wagon which 
was making a left turn. He looked for any other on-coming 
vehicles which would have posed an immediate hazard and there was 
none to be seen. He then proceeded to make his turn and was 
struck by the plaintiff's vehicle. (See Statement of Facts). 
The passenger in the defendant's vehicle, Shelley 
Lambert, testified that she also saw the station wagon start to 
make a left-hand turn. She did not observe any other vehicles 
which would pose an immediate hazard. She was comfortable with 
Fry proceeding with his turn (TR, pg. 110). 
The defendant's expert witness testified that the 
larger vehicle provided an obstruction which prevented Fry from 
seeing the Petersen vehicle. As a result, his opinion was that 
the defendant's actions were not unreasonable. (R-497). 
Plaintiff's experts disagreed with Fry's description of his 
actions and testified that in their opinion, Fry was negligent. 
The jury found that Fry's actions were, in fact, 
reasonable under the circumstances which the jury determined to 
be in existence at the time of the accident. 
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The court in finding no. 9 discusses the case of French 
v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 117 Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002 (1950). 
The court cited a portion of that decision found on page 1004. 
The court failed to cite or to give any weight to that portion of 
the French decision which states that the statute dealing with 
right of way "anticipates the exercise of reasonable judgment on 
the part of the driver turning." 216 P.2d at 1004. The facts in 
French were critically different. The court referred to those 
facts as follows: 
Visibility was good and no reasons were given 
as to why each vehicle was not at all times 
clearly visible to the other driver. 
216 P.2d at 1003. (Emphasis added.) 
During the course of the trial, and during arguments on 
the motion for directed verdict, the court acknowledged that Dr. 
Limpert's testimony created a factual dispute as to whether or 
not Fry's actions were reasonable. The court again used the 
label "unavoidable accident" in making that determination. (TR, 
pg. 195). 
In order for the court to reach the findings of 
paragraphs 12 and 13, the court had to settle critical factual 
disputes. The trial court overstepped its role by resolving 
those disputes. The court does have discretion in giving jury 
instructions. However, the trial court cannot substitute its 
12 
judgment for that of the jury. The questions presented to the 
jury were (1) what were the circumstances which existed at the 
time that Mr. Fry made his turn, and, (2) given those facts and 
circumstances, were Mr. Fry's actions reasonable. Since the 
underlying circumstances presented a factual dispute, it was 
improper for the trial court to rule that it "cannot find that 
this accident was an unavoidable accident." 
The court in addition to finding this was not an 
"unavoidable accident," ruled that Fry did not keep a proper 
lookout, again resolving the factual dispute which should be 
decided by a jury. An evaluation of the court's ruling indicates 
that the court is attempting to, in effect, render Utah Code Ann. 
S 41-6-73 a strict liability statute. Such an effort has been 
expressly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. In Anderson v. 
Tgone, supra at 172, the court held: 
The law is well settled in our jurisdiction 
that most cases involving negligence are not 
susceptible to summary disposition, finding a 
defendant negligent as a matter of law. 
* * * 
Plaintiff reasons that defendant's 
failure to keep a proper lookout was 
negligence as a matter of law and thus that 
issue should not have been submitted to the 
jury to be decided. But we have heretofore 
held that what constitutes a proper lookout 
is a question for the jury as the individual 
fact situation in each case does not lend 
itself to a rigid application of any rule, 
13 
but demands instead a determination of the 
conditions as they existed at the time of the 
accident. (Cite omitted.) 
The Utah Supreme Court previously overturned a trial 
judge's similar attempts to impose strict liability on a claimed 
failure to maintain a proper lookout. In Durrant v. Pelton, 16 
Utah 2d 7, 394 P.2d 879, 881 (1964), the court held: 
However, the test "[a]s to what constitutes a 
proper lookout is usually * * * a latter-day 
classic question for jury determination, and 
each trial and appellate court must determine 
the question as a matter of law only when 
convinced that reasonable persons could not 
disagree upon the question when 
conscientiously applying fact to law". 
* * * 
A jury should determine what a reasonable and 
prudent person would do under the conditions 
as they existed at the time of the accident. 
In Smith v. Galleaos, 16 Utah 2d 344, 400 P.2d 570, 572 
(Utah 1965), the court addressed the same issue presented in this 
appeal. It held: 
Justice does not sanction any such favoring 
of one party at the expense of the other. It 
imposes upon all drivers, including not only 
the left turner, ... but also upon the 
oncoming vehicle . .. the fundamental duty 
which pervades the entire law of torts and 
from which no one is at any time excused: to 
use that degree of care which a reasonable 
and prudent person would use under the 
circumstances for the safety of himself and 
others« 
• * * 
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If the left turner in performing his duty, 
and in making the required observation, sees 
no vehicle approaching, or that any coming is 
far enough away so that he can reasonably 
believe that he has time to make his turn, he 
may proceed. 
In King v. Fereday, supra, the plaintiff argued that a 
rear-end collision constituted a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-62 and amounted to negligence per se. The court held: 
Plaintiff's argument therefore assumes that 
the fact of the collision alone establishes a 
violation of the statute. In McCloud v. 
Baum, this Court held that a collision alone 
does not create an inference of negligence. 
Id. at 1127-28. 
Id. at 620. 
Finally, in Maltby v. Cox Construction Co., Inc., 598 
P.2d 336, 340 (Utah 1979), the court analyzed plaintiff's jury 
instruction which would have directed a verdict in their favor. 
The court helds 
This requested instruction is tantamount 
to an instruction that rear-end collisions 
are invariably the result of the negligence 
of the driver of the following vehicle. The 
instruction was properly refused. The Court 
properly instructed the jury as to the duties 
and responsibilities of each of these parties 
to keep a proper lookout, to keep their 
respective vehicles under proper control, and 
to use such care as a reasonable prudent 
person would use under the circumstances. 
The jury was persuaded that Pritchard's 
actions were reasonable under these 
circumstances, and that plaintiff's were not. 
15 
In light of the long standing case law in Utah 
spelling out the jury's role to determine what constitutes 
issues of negligence, the trial court committed reversible error 
in entering its finding that Fry "did not keep a proper lookout 
for eastbound on-coming traffic." 
It was improper for the trial court judge to attempt to 
impose a form of strict liability upon this defendant. The Court 
of Appeals must assume that the jury resolved the factual 
disputes in favor of defendant Fry. The jury concluded that the 
conduct of Fry was reasonable and prudent under the facts as they 
determined them. Even those "findings" reached by the trial 
court illustrate the factual conflict that the jury was called 
upon to resolve. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
FINDING THAT THE JURY WAS CONFUSED. SUCH A 
FINDING WAS UNSUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND, 
EVEN IF TRUEf WOULD NOT RESULT IN A REVERSAL 
OF THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
The trial court in paragraph 15 of its ruling on 
plaintiff's motion for directed verdict found: 
15. This Court also finds that the jury was 
confused in its application of the jury 
instructions to the facts of the case by 
essentially concluding the collision to be an 
unavoidable accident. 
16 
The record is devoid of any facts upon which the court 
could have entered such a finding. The only passing reference to 
the jury's deliberations occurred during oral arguments on the 
motion for directed verdict. In making his argument, counsel for 
the plaintiff attempted to inform the court of conversations he 
had had with a member of the jury. Those conversations were 
objected to and no other references were made to them. Utah law 
is clear on the permissible examination of jury deliberations. 
In Cooper v. Evans, 1 Utah 2d 68, 262 P.2d 278, 279 (1953), the 
court rejected even the use of formal affidavits from the jurors 
after several members of the jury claimed to have misunderstood 
the jury instructions. The court ruled: 
Upon the motion for a new trial, proof of 
such misunderstanding was proffered in 
affidavit form. These latter matters, 
including the proof by affidavit, were 
properly disregarded. Jurors may not thus 
impeach their own verdict because of 
disappointment or even confusion. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Even if the trial court's "finding" concerning jury 
confusion was accurate and supported by the record, such a 
finding would not warrant reversal of the jury's verdict. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a)(2) authorizes 
a jury verdict to be impeached by the affidavits of a juror only 
on certain narrowly defined grounds of jury misconduct. In 
Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372, 375) (Utah 1983), they held: 
17 
This court has interpreted Rule 59(a)(2) to 
allow an affidavit by juror to impeach the 
verdict only when the verdict was determined 
by chance or bribery. (Cite omitted.) 
The rationale behind such a restriction was spelled out 
in State of Utah v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah App. 1989). 
The court there ruled that: 
The reason for narrowly limiting the 
circumstances under which jury affidavits can 
be used to impeach a jury verdict is that 
otherwise, litigants would obtain juror 
affidavits on "all manner of things" and the 
process would become interminable and 
impracticable. (Cite omitted). Further 
"[s]uch post mortems would be productive of 
no end of mischief and render service as a 
juror unbearable". 
In the instant matter, plaintiff produced no affidavits 
upon which the court could have found that the jury was confused. 
Further, such a finding, according to Utah case law, does not 
warrant reversal of the jury's verdict. This "finding" by the 
trial court illustrates the court's obsession with the label 
"unavoidable accident" and the lack of support for the court's 
ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
Based solely on the testimony and the reasonable 
inferences that were drawn from it, John Fry and Shelley Lambert 
created factual disputes. The jury was asked to resolve those 
disputes. In relying upon the testimony of Rhodes' experts, the 
18 
court had to believe one set of contested facts over the other. 
Those facts the court chose to believe were the opposite of 
those the jury believed. Such actions by the trial court 
constitute reversible error. 
It is respectfully submitted that the j.n.o.Vc should 
be reversed and the jury's verdict should be reinstated. 
DATED this ^ P day of November, 1989. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
SCOTT W.\ CHRlStfENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, this %DD day of November, 1989, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to the* following: 
Fred D. Howard, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
120 East 300 North Street 
P,0. Box 778 
Provo, UT 84603 
ftJ&iffM 
83-612.51 
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ADDENDUM 
111^ 
MAR I 5 1989 
iSOM EPPERSON & SMITH! 
I , ' 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
********* 
HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES : 
Plaintiff, : RULING 
vs. : 
JOHN M. FRY and JUDITH L. : 
FRY 
Defendant/Third-Party 
Plaintiff, : JUDGE BOYD L. PARK 
v. : Civil No. 64,555 
WILLIAM C. PETERSEN, : 
Third-Party Defendant. : 
* * * * * * * * * 
The above captioned matter was tried before a jury on 
November 28-30, 1988. On the morning of November 30, 1988, just 
prior to rebutal testimony and the Courts reading of the jury 
instructions to the jury and final arguments, attorney Fred 
Howard moved the Court for a Directed Verdict on the issue of 
liability of the Defendant, John M. Fry. Attorney Howard made an 
oral Motion and also submitted his Motion in writing, supported 
by a written Memorandum entitled "Plaintiff's Memorandum In 
Opposition To An Instruction On Unavoidable Accident And In 
Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For Directed Verdict." The Court 
heard oral argument, and Scott W. Christensen, attorney for 
Utf? 
Defendant Fryf requested an opportunity to file a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Memorandum. The Court granted attorney 
Christensen's request and took the Motion under advisement. The 
jury trial continued and the question of Defendant John M. Fry's 
negligence was submitted to the jury. The parties had previously 
stipulated that the Plaintiff was not negligent. At the 
conclusion of the testimony of the witnesses the Court granted 
attorney Ray Phillips Ivie's Motion for Directed Verdict for 
Defendant William C. Petersen, the Court finding no evidence was 
produced during the trial showing Defendent Petersen to be 
negligent. The jury returned the special verdict form finding 
Defendant John M. Fry not negligent. 
The parties now having submitted all the Memorandum in 
Support of and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Directed 
Verdict and the Court having heard oral arguments and being fully 
advised in the premises makes the following findings and ruling: 
FINDINGS 
1. On or about December 11, 1982, the Defendant, John M. 
Fry, was driving a 1979 Chevrolet CIO pick-up truck which was 
involved in a collision with a 1966 two-door Volkeswagen driven 
by Third-Party Defendant, William C. Petersen. The accident 
occurred at the intersection of State Road 265 and Main Street in 
Orem, Utah at approximately 6s22 p.m.. The intersection was 
regulated by traffic lights. 
2. The Plaintiff, Harold Edwin Rhodes, was a passenger in 
the vehicle driven by Third-Party Defendant, William C. Petersen. 
The occupants of the Petersen vehicle were all rendered 
unconscious from the accident and have no memory of the 
circumstances occurring at the time of the accident. 
3. Prior to the collision, the Fry vehicle was travelling 
west bound on State Road—265, and the Petersen vehicle east 
bound. Defendant Fry testified that he brought his vehicle to a 
stop at the intersection while he faced a red light. When the 
light turned green, he perceived a station wagon approaching that 
was going to make a left turn. He did not see the Petersen 
vehicle, and therefore proceeded to turn to the left across the 
eastbound lane of travel of the Petersen vehicle. In an attempt 
to avoid Defendant Fry's vehicle, as it turned in front of 
Petersen's vehicle, Petersen applied the brakes and his vehicle 
laid down 35 feet 11 inches of tire skid marks, before the point 
of impact between the two vehicles. (See Exhibits 2 and 10) 
4. The investigating Officer, Fran Fillmore and accident 
reconstructionists, Newell Knight and Greg Duval, testified that 
Defendant Fry was negligent. 
5. John M. Fry's expert accident reconstructionist, Rudolph 
Limpert, stated on direct examination when asked: "Based on your 
experience in accident investigation and reconatruction, what 
caused this accident?": 
MA set of unfortunate circumstances, 
a vehicle driving behind a station 
wagon, a large domestic or American 
station wagon that's some distance 
behind. One could calculate how small 
that Volkeswagen is in relationship 
to the perspective of that big car, 
the station wagon obstructing it's 
view. And then the unfortunate accident 
occurred. So I don't see anything 
unreasonable in terms of the left turn 
by Mr. Fry when he made the left turn." 
(Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, 
Testimony of Rudolph Limpert, November 
29, 1988, 2:10 p.m. transcribed p.30) 
6. The jury by Special Verdict found Defendant, John M. 
Fry, not negligent. The jury finding, together with the Court's 
instruction to the jury that the Plaintiff was not negligent as 
stipulated by the parties and further that the Court had found as 
a matter of law Defendant Petersen was not negligent, resulted in 
what would have to be termed an unavoidable accident« The Court 
had refused to give an unavoidable accident instruction. The 
jury further found Plaintiff, Harold E. Rhodes, incurred 
$21,000.00 in special damages and $29,000.00 in general damages. 
7. Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-73, which was 
submitted as jury instruction No. 23, states: 
The operator of a vehicle intending to 
turn to the left shall yield the right-
of-way to any vehicle approaching from 
the opposite direction which is so close 
to the turning vehicle as to constitute 
an immediate hazard. 
8. This Court finds that Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-
6-73, is applicable to the case at bar and creates a statutory 
duty on all operators of motor vehicles who make left hand turns 
to " . . . yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from 
the opposite direction which is so close to the turning vehicle 
as to constitute an immediate hazard." 
9. This Court also follows the ruling in French v. Utah Oil 
Ref. Co., 117 Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002, 1004 (1950) wherein the 
Utah Supreme Court held: 
• . . a burden is placed on the driver 
making the turn as he has control of 
the situation, and if there is a reasonable 
probability that the movement cannot be 
made in safety then the disfavored driver 
should yield. The driver proceeding 
straight ahead has little opportunity to 
know a vehicle is to be turned across his 
path until the movement is commenced and 
in many instances, the warning is too late 
for the latter driver to take effective 
action. 
10c The Court also adheres to the rationale of Yeates v. 
Budge, 122 Utah 518, 252 P.2d 220 (1953) wherein the Utah Supreme 
Court held that where a defendant attempted to turn across the 
path of the plaintiff, when he was only 40 feet away, the trial 
court could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff was so close 
as to constitute an immediate hazard and that the defendant 
should have yielded the right-of-way to him. 
11. This Court is reluctant to take from the jury its fact 
finding responsibility regarding negligence of the parties and 
whether the negligence was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's 
injuries. The Court is mindful of those cases in which the 
Supreme Court has concluded that juries should be fact finders. 
(Mel Hardntan Productions, Inc.f v. Robinson, 604 P. 2d 913, 917 
(Utah 1979)) 
12. The Court however, given all the testimony of the 
witnesses, and in fairness and equity cannot find that this 
accident was an unavoidable accident. The Utah Supreme Court has 
defined an unavoidable accident as " . . . an unusual and 
unexpected occurrence "which result[s] in injury and which 
happen[s] without anyone failing to exercise reasonable care . . 
*
 M
 (Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corporation, 681 P.2d 1232, 
1237 (Utah 1984)) and (Stringham v. Broderick, 529 P.2d 425, 426 
(Utah 1974) 
13. Even should this Court ignore the testimony of those 
witnesses who testified that Defendant Fry was negligent and look 
only to the testimony of Fry's witness, Rudy Limpert, (according 
to his calculations this was an unfortunate accident), this Court 
is of the opinion that the accident was not an unavoidable 
accident as defined by the Supreme Court of this state. 
14. This Court finds that Defendant, John M. Fry, made a 
left hand turn across on coming traffic heading eastbound along 
State Road 265 and did not keep a proper lookout for eastbound 
oncoming traffic which resulted in his colliding with Third-Party 
Defendant, William C. Petersen's vehicle thus violating his 
statutory duty pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-73. 
15. This Court also finds that the jury was confused in 
its application of the jury instructions to the facts of the case 
by essentially concluding the collision to be an unavoidable 
accident. 
16. This Court further finds that Plaintiff, Harold Edwin 
Rhodes, is entitled to a Directed Verdict holding that Defendant, 
John M. Fry, negligently operated his vehicle which was the 
proximate cause of the Plaintifffs injuries. 
RULING 
1. Plaintiff, Harold Edwin Rhodes', Motion for a Directed 
Verdict is granted. 
2. Counsel for the Plaintiff is to prepare an Order 
consistent with the above Ruling. 
DATED this £% day of March, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
ccs Fred Howard, Esq 
R. Phil Ivie, Esq. 
Scott Christensen, Esq. 
FRED D. HOWARD (1547), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 Sac* 300 North Strati 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Ttltphont: (801)373-8345 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
OurFil«No. 14,608 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT 
JOHN M. FRY, JUDITH L. 
FRY and WILLIAM C PETERSON, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 64,555 
Judge Cullen Y„ Christenscn 
Comes now the plaintiff and moves the court for a directed verdict on the issue 
of liability for the reasons and upon the grounds as follows: 
1. The Court has ruled that the driver of the plaintiffs car was not 
negligent as a matter of law. 
2. There can be no fault imputed to the plaintiff. 
3. The defendant, Fry, cannot rely upon the defense of unavoidable 
accident because this is not the "rare9 case in which such an instruction would be 
permissible. See memorandum attached. 
4. The defendant has proffered no excuse or explanation for the accident. 
There are no facts that would explain the events giving rise to the collision except the 
negligence of the defendant 
The plaintiff respectfully submits he is entitled to a directed verdict as a 
matter of right and that it would be error to fail to grant this motion. 
DATED this ffi day of November, 1988. 
FREb D. HOWAR'D, foi / 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
HAND DELIVERED to Scott Christensen this < £ 2 - d a v o f November, 1988. 
K(Et> D. HOWARD, for 
7IOWARD, LE^ VIS & PET ERSEN 
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